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CONGRESS AND THE SHERMAN
ANTITRUST LAW: 1887-1890
W=Aaxt L. LETwINtTHE DECEPTIVE simplicity of the Sherman Act' has led many his-
torians to believe that the intention of Congress was equally simple.
Although they have not agreed on what the intention was, these
historians have shared the view that the motives of Congress were elementary
and unmixed and have differed chiefly over whether Congress was sincere.
Some suppose that the congressmen of 1890 were committed to a policy of
laissez-faire, interpret that policy as a dogmatic faith in competition, and
regard the Sherman Act as an effort to enforce that orthodoxy.2 Others less
trustful maintain that the Act was a fraud, contrived to soothe the public
without injuring the trusts, and they insist that no other result was possible
because the Republican Party, in control of the 51st Congress, was "itself
dominated at the time by many of the very industrial magnates most vul-
nerable to real antitrust legislation." 3 Both these schools can draw support
from distinguished men who lived while the Act was being passed.
4
But the process by which laws are made in the American democracy is not
so direct and obvious. Congress does not merely enact its private dogmas,
nor does it simply supply whatever the people order. Public opinion is not so
precise. Far from demanding a particular law, the public desires at most a
certain kind of law, and more often only wants to be rid of a general evil.
Sometimes, indeed, public opinion is practically silent and yet effective, for
Congress often refuses to pass laws because it expects that the public would
object, or adopts them anticipating that the public will approve. Congress is
t- Research Associate, University of Chicago Law School.
'26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. S 1 (1951).
2 This view is taken, for instance, by the authoritative text, Seager and Gulick, Trust and
Corporation Problems 373 (1929). See also, Mund, Government and Business 145, 146, 150
(1950).
"Fainsod and Gordon, Government and the American Economy 450 (1941). Cochran
and Miller, The Age of Enterprise 171-2 (1942). See also, Papandreou and Wheeler, Com-
petition and Its Regulation 213 (1954) in which the Sherman Act is described as a measure
of "appeasement."
' Senator Platt said that his colleagues were interested in only one thing, "to get some bill
headed: 'A Bill to Punish Trusts' with which to go to the country." Coolidge, An Old-
Fashioned Senator: Orville H. Platt 444 (1910). Justice Holmes thought that the Act was
"a humbug based on economic ignorance and incompetence." I Holmes-Pollock Letters 163
(Howe ed., 1941).
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not a factory that mechanically converts opinion into statutes. The congress-
man is a representative, who must recognize at least some tendencies of public
opinion if he is to be re-elected. He is also a professional lawmaker, more
likely than not a lawyer by training, who is not indifferent to his craft. He
talks with lawyers, follows the decisions of judges, and reads law journals.
He is not unwilling to draw on the skill of other experts when the need arises,
and will take advice from businessmen, reformers, or economists. He is a
member of a political party, may feel loyal to its traditional policies and
obliged to support at least part of its current platform. Finally, he is an
individual with beliefs, interests, ambitious, and idiosyncrasies quite his own.
It should not be surprising then that although the Sherman Act was passed
by a virtually unanimous vote, and although its language is disarmingly clear,
the administrations and courts charged with enforcing it have experienced so
much difficulty in settling its meaning. For the Sherman Act reflects not only
the uncertainty present in every general law because its authors cannot foresee
the particular cases that will arise, but also the ambiguity that colors many
democratic laws because the authors cannot completely resolve the divergent
opinions and cross purposes that call it forth.
I
No one denies that Congress passed the Sherman Act in response to real
public feeling against the trusts, but at this distance it is difficult to be sure
how hostile the public was and why. The intensity of public opposition, diffi-
cult though it may be to assess, is of some importance in explaining what
Congress did. If public hatred of trusts was violent, or if congressmen thought
it was, then they might have felt so pressed to pass the law, whatever their
own judgments, as to have done the work hastily and perhaps spitefully. If,
on the other hand, the public opposition was firm but calm, then Congress
may have felt free to pass the best law it could devise. In fact, though the
public sentiment may not have been so intense as some believed, yet it was
more deeply rooted than many have noticed, and sufficient in any event to per-
suade Congress that something had to be done; but since the public, despite
its hostility, did not and could not suggest any specific solution for the prob-
lem, Congress was left very much to its own devices in deciding what was to
be done.
In the years immediately before the Sherman Act, between 1888 and 1890,
there were few who doubted that the public hated the trusts fervently. Those
who fanned the prejudice and those who hoped to smother it agreed that the
fire was already blazing. Radical agitators and polite reformers spoke admir-
ingly of the "people's wrath." Apologists for the trust did not deny its unpop-
ularity. Dodd, the Standard Oil Company lawyer who invented the trust de-
vice, was properly mild when he told the merchants of Boston that there was
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'Can earnest popular prejudice against trade combinations"; 5 but George Gun-
ton, a scholarly defender of Standard Oil, wrote that "the public mind has
begun to assume a state of apprehension, almost amounting to alarm." Those
whose professional interests lay not so much in provoking or fearing the pub-
lic reaction as in gauging it agreed that it was intense. Journalists gave every
action of the trusts and of their critics ample publicity,7 which suggests that
they did not find their readers indifferent. The din forced Charles Francis
Adams, a calm and judicious man, to complain that an innocent plan for
coordinating railroads was no sooner announced than it was "characterized in
the papers as a vast 'trust'--in these days," he added, "everything is a
'trust'--and denounced as a conspiracy." s Another railroad president said that
he knew of no trust that had injured the public, and thought that "the atti-
tude of the press and the consequent temper of the people are breeding a
greater panic than the country has ever seen."9 The editor of a law journal
said that the ordinary man was "in a feverish state" about trusts even though
he knew nothing about them; "He has been taught his terror by the news-
papers and politicians."'1 It was certainly true that politicians, whether or
not they taught terror, assumed that it existed. Representative Raynor of
Maryland urged a congressional committee in 1888 to waste no time on in-
vestigation; it need only "listen to the voice of a suffering people resounding
through the homes and business centers of this country, and through the
medium of an enlightened press appealing to their representatives to rescue
them," to see the urgency of accepting his antitrust bill." Many congressmen
who participated in the debate on antitrust measures made declarations equally
dramatic, if not always as dire as Senator Sherman's warning that the "popu-
lar mind is agitated with problems that may disturb social order."'12
These impressions of the state of public opinion were supported by more
nearly impartial contemporaries, including the judges who, with William
Howard Taft, took it quite for granted that the Act "was a step taken by
Congress to meet what the public had found to be a growing and intolerable
evil."' 3 Here and there a few doubts were expressed about the public's deter-
mination. Some extremists said that the people could solve the trust prob-
lem-by establishing government ownership of all industry-if it would only
'Dodd, Address Before the Merchants' Association of Boston, 5 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 97
(1889).
6 Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 385 (1888).
Discussion infra at 224.
' Adams, Statement of Dec. 15, 1888, 4 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 579 (1888).
'Porter, writing in the Chi. Trib. (July 28, 1889), quoted in 6 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 103
(1889).
" 6 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 61 (1889). "N.Y. Times p. 5, col. I (Feb. 11, 1888).
221 Cong. Rec. 2,460 (1890).
'Taft, The Anti-Trust Act and the Supreme Court 2 (1914).
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awake and "prove itself worthy to be free."' 4 Some free-traders said that
trusts could be eradicated by abolishing protective tariffs, if the people would
only "open their eyes." 15 A skeptic has since held that government would have
destroyed the trusts, if the people had really cared.16 But these irregular
views have not received much notice, and most later commentators have been
satisfied to believe that there was a "great public outcry" against the trusts.1"
Those who have questioned this standard opinion have pointed out that
few books or journal articles were published on the trust problem before 1890,
fewer, at least, than were printed afterwards. This fact led a leading historian
of the Sherman Act, John Davidson Clark, to conclude that the public was
not "hysterical" but rather indifferent to the trusts.' 8 Unfortunately Clark
exaggerated the evidence. Far more was printed than he realized,19 and es-
pecially in the newspapers. For instance, in February, 1888, The New York
Times published articles and editorials about trusts on every day but one.2 0
If the Times was never again so persistent, neither did it become silent on the
subject, and it certainly did not-as Clark asserted-ignore the hearings of
the congressional committee investigating the trusts.21 The most widely dis-
tributed newspaper in the Midwest, the Chicago Tribune, was at least as as-
siduously interested.2 2 Moreover, there is evidence that other newspapers
throughout the country were not much less attentive to the problem.
2 3
"Lewis, A Talk About "Trusts" [13] (1889).
'N.Y. Times p. 4, col. 3 (Dec. 28, 1887) (editorial).
', Wolman, The Mortality of Trusts, 67 AIb. L.J. 227 (1905).
'¢ E.g., authorities cited notes 2 and 3 supra.
' Clark, The Federal Trust Policy 27-37 (1931). Clark tried to bolster his case with other
evidence, some of which, however, is erroneous and the rest capable of different interpreta-
tion. It is not true, for instance, that the political parties "wholly overlooked" the trust
problem during the election campaign of 1888 (see discussion infra at 247-48) ; neither is
it necessary to believe that the twelve states which passed antitrust laws before July, 1890,
were merely following a fashion-particularly since the statutes were quite different from
each other.
"Sizable gaps in Clark's list of publications are indicated by Thorelli, The Federal Anti-
trust Policy 137 (1954).
'The missing day was Feb. 8th.
I The N.Y. Times reported on the hearings in its issues of Feb. 2, 11, 25, 29; March 9, 10,
11, 24, 26; April 7, 8, 14, 27, 28, 29; May 1, 2, 4, 5, 22; July 21, 28 of 1888. Compare Clark,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 33.
"During the first week of February, 1888, the Chicago Tribune published the following
articles on trusts. Feb. 1: p. 3, col. 1, p. 4, col. 6, p. 9, col. 2; Feb. 2: p. 2, col. 3, p. 4, col. 1,
p. 6, col. 5; Feb. 3: p. 1, col. 4, p. 1, col. 6, p. 3, col. 6, p. 6, col. 5, p. 8, col. 2, p. 8, col. 5;
Feb. 4: p. 1, col. 4, p. 1, col. 3, p. 2, col. 6, p. 3, col. 6, p. 6, col. 1, p. 6, col. 6; Feb. 5: p. 10,
col. 2, p. 14, col. 5, p. 17, col 7; Feb. 6: p. 3, col 4, p. 4, col. 1. The articles concerned the
Standard Oil, Sugar, Whisky, Stove, Salt, Chicago Gas, Castor-Oil, Coal, and Starch trusts,
and a New York antitrust bill.
' At least thirty-one newspapers outside New York published articles on trusts which
were quoted by the journal Public Opinion. Thorelli, op. cit. supra note 19, at 141 n. 138.
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Antitrust sentiment, in any case, cannot be measured merely by counting
the number of articles concerned exclusively with trusts that appeared exactly
within the three years prior to the passage of the Sherman Act. The great
political problems of a period are not so easily isolated. The true importance
of the monopoly problem in public opinion is more nearly revealed by how
much it pervaded the discussion of the leading political questions of those
years.
Between 1887 and 1890 the tariff question had priority in the newspapers,
party platforms, and, as Senator Sherman himself said, in the work of the
51st Congress. 24 But the pre-eminence of the tariff question did not detract
from the trust problem, and if the tariff constantly intruded in congres-
sional debate on trusts, so did the trust problem regularly infiltrate discus-
sion of tariffs. When Chicago meat-packers petitioned Congress to repeal the
tariff on salt, their congressman said that the strongest argument for their
case was the Michigan salt monopoly.2 5 When Representative Randall an-
nounced that the revenue bill he was introducing would, among other things,
set a high duty on steel rails, those who saw in his proposal the hand of the
Iron and Steel Association promptly labeled it "a bill for the perpetuation of
trusts."26 And in the Senate, debate on the Dependent Pension Bill-a scheme
for disposing of surplus revenues-centered for a while on the accusation that
Blair of New Hampshire, as an advocate of tariffs, was a defender of trusts,
which he denied as one rejecting a heresy: "They are abhorrent to me. 127
The trust problem was regarded as an integral part also of other leading
political questions. Current discussions of how to improve federal regulation
of railroads were largely concerned with whether "pools" should be allowed,
and it was repeatedly said that these would produce the same monopolistic
combinations so much objected to when they took the form of trusts. Labor
unions, whose rights and limitations were a subject of angry debate, were on
the one hand defended as necessary to enable workmen to deal with the trusts,
on the other hand condemned for being monopolies as obnoxious as the trusts
themselves. The low income of farmers, for which remedies were constantly
being considered, was often said to be aggravated by various trusts, such as
those that sold farmers bags and bought their linseed and cotton-seed. The
general problem of poverty, a great concern of the time, was regularly said
to be accentuated by the trusts, which were accused of dividing the country
into two classes, the very rich and the very poor.
"Sen. Sherman to Gen. V. T. Sherman, Nov. 9, 1889, The Sherman Letters 379 (Thorn-
dike ed., 1894).
1 Chi. Trib. p. 1, col. 1 (Feb. 1, 1888).
"N.Y. Times p. 5, col. 1 (March 6, 1888).
'N.Y. Times p. 2, col. 6 (March 2, 1888).
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The pervasive antitrust sentiment did not spring up overnight. Hatred of
monopoly is one of the oldest American political habits and like most pro-
found traditions, it consisted of an essentially permanent idea expressed at
different times. "Monopoly," as the word was used in America, meant at first
a special legal privilege granted by the state; later it came more often to
mean exclusive control that a few persons achieved by their own efforts; but it
always meant some sort of unjustified power, especially one that raised ob-
stacles to equality of opportunity. The trust was popularly regarded as noth-
ing but a new form of monopoly, and the whole force of the tradition was
focused against it immediately.
The principle that government should create no monopolies was one of
those deep political convictions that the colonists had brought with them from
England. There the matter had been settled in 1624 by the Statute of Mo-
nopolies, which closely limited the King's power to grant exclusive privileges.2 8
In America the same attitude was expressed when the colonial legislature of
Massachusetts decreed that "there shall be no monopolies granted or allowed
among us but of such new inventions as are profitable to the country, and that
for a short time."2 9 Soon after the Revolution several states included in their
bills of rights rather more philosophic statements, similar to that adopted by
Virginia: "No man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emolu-
ments or privileges from the community... .,30 Jefferson thought that a pro-
hibition to the same effect should appear in the federal Bill of Rights,3 ' and
there are signs that his opinion was widely supported. Several of the states,
having agreed to ratify the Constitution although they were not satisfied that
it sufficiently guaranteed the people's rights, proposed amendments which they
submitted with their acts of ratification. Among these were proposals offered
by New York, "that the Congress do not grant monopolies," 3 2 and by Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, "that the Congress erect no
company of merchants with exclusive advantages of commerce." 33 In the end,
however, no specific prohibition of monopoly was included in the federal Bill
of Rights. Some afterwards maintained that since the power of creating mo-
nopolies had not been explicitly denied to Congress, it had been implicitly con-
ceded;3 4 others said that a legislature could not grant monopolies unless the
2 21 James I, c. 3 (1623-24).
c. 71 (1641) ; Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts
Bay 170 (1814).
'Va. Bill of Rights § 4 (1776) ; Mass. Const. Part I, Art. 6 (1780) ; Conn. Const. Art. 1,
§ 1 (1818).
'Jefferson, 5 Works 371 (Ford ed., 1904) (Jefferson to Madison, Dec. 20, 1787).
"I Elliot, Debates in the Several State Conventions 330 (2d ed., 1854).
-Ibid., at 323, 326, 337.
" Rep. Lawrence, in congressional debate on the first Bank of the United States, Feb. 4,
1791. 2 Debates and Proceedings in Congress of United States 1915 (Gales, comp., 1834).
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Constitution expressly authorized it; 5 but no one argued that the prohibition
was omitted because the public favored or was even indifferent to monopolies.
In spite of this hostility, the federal government after the Revolution did
from time to time create private monopolies, but these did more to renew and
deepen the public sentiment than to dilute it. The most numerous were patent
monopolies granted to inventors, but the patent system was generally tolerated
as a traditional exception to the traditional principle. Other monopolies, such
as the two Banks of the United States,3 6 were not tolerated so quietly. The
debates on the first Bank, both when it was created in 1791 and when it was
discontinued twenty years later, were concerned mainly with the constitu-
tional question whether Congress had authority to create corporations and es-
pecially banks. However, many objections besides the constitutional one were
raised: that the plan for the Bank was ill-devised, that state banks would
render better service, and not least, that the national bank would be a mo-
nopoly-since the plan committed the United States to establish no competing
banks.37 In the Senate, an unsuccessful attempt was made to delete the mo-
nopoly clause; 33 in the House, the Bank's opponents did not fail to seize on
this objection. James Jackson of Georgia called the Bank "a monopoly, such
an one as contravenes the spirit of the constitution-a monopoly of a very
extraordinary nature-a monopoly of the public moneys for the benefit of the
corporation to be created," 39 while James Madison, its most active enemy,
criticized it somewhat more judiciously as "a monopoly which affects the
equal rights of every citizen."140 The Bank's supporters did not deny the prin-
ciple of this attack. Hamilton, in replying to the adverse opinion that Jefferson
had submitted to Washington, did not maintain that monopoly was good but
'As Attorney General of the United States, Taney gave this opinion in 1833 concerning
the monopoly granted the Camden and Amboy Railroad by the New Jersey legislature.
Dodd, American Business Corporations 125 (1954).
" Their predecessor, The Bank of North America, incorporated in 1781 by the Continental
Congress, was accepted because it would help finance the Revolution, and no great com-
motion was aroused by the recommendation of Congress that so long as the war lasted
the states should neither incorporate nor endure any other banks. 20 Journals of the Con-
tinental Congress 547, 21 ibid. 1190 (Hunt ed., 1912). When the Bank, uncertain whether
the congressional charter was valid, petitioned the states for reassurance, seven of them
quickly passed acts confirming its legality and granting the requested monopoly for the
duration of the war. 2 Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations 38
(1917). But after 1784 the states withdrew the privilege: Massachusetts, New York and
Maryland incorporated new banks, while Pennsylvania, the Bank's home state, was per-
suaded by attacks on the Bank's policies and privilege ,to repeal its charter and finally to
grant a new and more restricted one. Ibid., at 41-43.
I Clarke and Hall, Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United
States 33 (1832).
"Ibid., at 36.
Ibid., at 37.
Ibid., at 43.
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rather that the Bank's privilege did not constitute a monopoly. "Monopoly
implies," he said, "a legal impediment to carrying on the trade by others than
those to whom it was granted," 41 and since the Act to create a Bank of the
United States did not prohibit the states from incorporating banks or citizens
from operating unincorporated banks, it created no monopoly.
Opposition to monopoly, important but not critical in determining the af-
fairs of the first Bank of the United States, became a chief weapon against the
second Bank. President Jackson and his lieutenants, who led the movement,
attacked the Bank on two scores: since its charter expressly guaranteed that
the federal government would create no other banks, it was a monopoly in
the strict legal sense; since it was too big and rich, it was also a monopoly in
the broader political sense. Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, the Bank's chief
opponent in the Senate, argued accordingly that it was objectionable not only
"on account of the exclusive privileges, and anti-republican monopoly, which
it gives to the stockholders," but also "because it tends to aggravate the in-
equality of fortunes" and is "an institution too great and powerful to be
tolerated in a Government of free and equal laws."'42 Jackson, when he vetoed
the bill renewing the Bank's charter, emphasized the "great evils to our coun-
try and institutions [that] might flow from such a concentration of power
in the hands of a few men irresponsible to the people. '43 Amos Kendall, who
as a member of Jackson's Kitchen Cabinet wrote the first draft of the veto
message, 44 in his own public addresses also called the Bank a threat to democ-
racy. All nations in the past, he said, had been controlled by "Nobility Sys-
tems," and now one was growing up in America: "Its head is the Bank of the
United States; its right arm, a protecting Tariff and Manufacturing Monop-
olies; its left, growing State debts and State incorporations.1 45 In the end
this maneuver of repeatedly condemning the Bank as a "monster monopoly,"
a "moneyed power" that would establish an oligarchy and eventually a
monarchy,48 defeated the Bank's supporters and led to its destruction.
There were other institutions, more numerous and permanent than the cen-
tral banks, against which public opposition to monopoly was more regularly
expressed. Chief among these was the corporation. The view that all corpora-
tions are monopolies was as old as the principle that all monopolies are evil,
and like it, was founded on English experience. One of the most common
forms of the early corporation in England was the guild-indeed there had
'1 Ibid., at 101.
7 Cong. Deb. 50-54 (1831).
"2 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 581 (Richardson ed., 1900).
Schlesinger, Age of Jackson 89 (1945).
"Wash. Globe, Dec. 13, 1832, quoted ibid., at 97.
"Consult Knox, History of Banking in the United States 69-70 (1903).
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been a time when "incorporated" was a synonym for "guildated" 47 -and the
guild was a monopoly, since it could prevent everyone but its members from
following its trade.4 8 Another important group of corporations was composed
of the great companies for foreign trade, most of which were monopolies,
since their charters granted exclusive rights to commerce with certain parts
of the world.4 9 Since these prominent monopolies made up most of the private
corporations, it was not hard to slip into thinking that all corporations were
monopolies, and this belief became quite popular in the United States. This
was not so much because American states continued the practice of English
governments. They seldom gave corporations exclusive rights, and when they
did it was to toll-bridge, turnpike, canal, and railroad companies. Though
these grants did arouse some vigorous opposition, the fact that the recipients
were "public service" corporations seems to have been regarded as a mitigating
circumstance.8 0
In America every corporation, whether or not it had an express monopoly,
was considered monopolistic simply because it was a corporation. This was
partly because all corporations before the end of the eighteenth century, and
most of them before the Civil War, were chartered by special legislation. Each
was authorized by a separate act that prescribed its distinctive organization
and defined the rights and duties peculiar to it. No group of men could form
a corporation unless the state legislature passed a special act in their favor,
and those who succeeded were regarded as privileged above their fellows. The
mere existence of a corporation was therefore proof that it was a monopoly.
So Theodore Sedgwick reasoned: "Corporations can only obtain existence...
by a special grant from the Legislature. Charters of incorporation are there-
fore grants of privilege, to be exclusively enjoyeyd by the corporators ...
Every grant of exclusive privilege, strictly speaking, creates a monopoly....,51
Also, every corporation had additional privileges, the real advantages that
made men want to incorporate, such as long life, limited liability, and in
"7 Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1860, 3 Select Essays on
Anglo-American Legal History 195, 198 (1909).
" Davenant v. Hurdis, Moore 576 (K.B., 1599) (The Merchant Tailors' Case).
'*East India Co. v. Sandys, 10 Howell's St. Tr. 372, 90 Eng. Rep. 62 (1685) (The Great
Case of Monopolies).
'The three earliest railroads in Massachusetts, incorporated in 1830, were given thirty
year monopolies of their routes, Kirkland, The "Railroad Scheme" of Massachusetts, 5 J.
Econ. Hist. 145, 164 (1945). Other instances of monopoly grants to such corporations are
cited by Dodd, op. cit. supra note 35, at 161, 127 n. 20, 162 (1954) and by Cadman, The
Corporation in New Jersey 224-27 (1949). Instances of opposition to them are given by 1
Davis, op. cit. supra note 36, at 193, 306, et seq., and by Cadman, supra, at 74. The ex-
ception in favor of public service corporations was endorsed even by such antagonists of
corporations as Taney, consult Swisher, Roger B. Taney 366-67 (1935) ; and Gov. Morton
of Massachusetts, consult Dodd, supra, at 311-12.
[Sedgwick] What Is a Monopoly 12 (1835).
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some early cases, public subsidies. All of these aggravated the complaint that
corporations were privileged, monopolistic bodies. The amplitude of privilege
sometimes easily justified the charge. For instance, New Jersey's first business
corporation, the Society for Establishing Useful Manufactures, was exempted
from paying taxes on much of its property, was given authority to conduct
lotteries and exercise the power of eminent domain, and enjoyed the addi-
tional subsidy that its workmen were exempt from all taxes and military
service. 12 It was no wonder then that critics said it was a part of "a new
system of monopolies," s3 or that a writer who signed himself "Anti-Monopo-
list," in attacking it, bewailed, "the present prevailing propensity for cor-
porations and exclusive privileges, a system of politics well calculated to ag-
grandize and increase the influence of the few at the expense of the many. '54
Even corporations that had no express monopolies and no extensive privileges
were attacked in the same terms. It became an axiom that corporations were
privileged bodies, monopolies incompatible with liberty, and this accusation
was repeated through the years. It was one of the objections urged in 1785
against a bill to incorporate a society of tradesmen and mechanics in New
York: "all incorporations imply a privilege given to one order of citizens
which others do not enjoy, and are so far destructive of that principle of equal
liberty which should subsist in every community." 55 It was one of the grounds
on which Connecticut in 1787 refused to incorporate a medical society, which
was denounced as "a combination of doctors.., directly against liberty...
a monopoly. ' 56 It was one of the arguments that Henry Clay in 1811 offered
against the Bank of the United States, when he said that the Bank's express
monopoly was not as offensive as its corporate status, and that to incorporate
competing banks would only compound the mischief, for "all corporations
enjoy exclusive privileges .... And if you create fifty corporations instead of
one, you have only fifty privileged bodies instead of one. ' 57 Finally, in the
1830's, it became the watchword of the great campaign that the Jacksonian
Democrats led against all private corporations. One of their journalists wrote
that "All Bank charters, all laws conferring special privileges, with all acts
of incorporations [sic], for purposes of private gain, are monopolies, inasmuch
as they are calculated to enhance the power of wealth, produce inequalities
among the people, and to subvert liberty."58 Another writer carried the argu-
ment one step further: "To have the land scattered over with incorporated
1 Davis, op. cit. supra note 36, at 384-5.
1 ibid., at 430. 2 ibid., at 303.
1 ibid., at 431. r 2 ibid., at 304.
W Clarke and Hall, op. cit. supra note 37, at 355.
' Cadman, op. cit. supra note 50, at 75, quoting Emporium and True American, March
28, 1835.
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companies, is to have a class of privileged, if not titled, nobility."59 This doc-
trine, embellished with various expressions of fear and horror, was proclaimed
on all sides. 60
The natural solution, if all corporations were evil, would have been to de-
stroy them all. There is a tone of martyred forbearance in the statements of
those Jacksonians and Locofocos, who much as they would have liked to re-
voke the rights of all existing corporations, said that to do so would "stain
the sacred faith of a whole people." 6' A more reasonable alternative was to
extend the evil no further, and some therefore said that the legislature "ought
cautiously to refrain from increasing the irresponsible power of any existing
corporations, or of chartering new ones."' 62 Others maintained that no new cor-
porations likely to compete with individual enterprises should be created, and
that in any case they ought not to enjoy the special advantage of limited
liability.63 The policy finally accepted was to reduce the privilege of incorpora-
tion, not by taking it from the few, but by opening it to the many: general
incorporation laws authorized state officials to issue charters to all qualified
applicants. A few such laws had been passed before 1837 by legislatures that
hoped to stimulate various branches of industry;6 4 they were recommended
also as devices to save legislatures the time otherwise spent in considering
special acts; 65 but they became normal only after the great agitation against
the monopolistic character of corporations created by special acts. Connecti-
cut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts passed general incorpora-
tion laws between 1837 and 1851, and several of the younger states-Califor-
nia, Indiana, and Minnesota-adopted constitutions during this period pro-
hibiting legislatures from creating private corporations in any other way.66 For
a time special incorporation persisted: in New Jersey, for instance, the num-
ber of incorporations under general law did not overtake those under special
acts until 1875.67 By the time of the Civil War incorporation under general
Ibid., at 77.
TIbid., at 72 et seq.; Dodd, op. cit. supra note 35, at 394-95, 414-15; Handlin, Common-
wealth Massachusetts 229-35 (1947) ; and for a compendium of examples, consult Schles-
inger, op. cit. supra note 44 (passim).
' Cadman, op. cit. supra note 50, at 76.
Ibid.
Ibid., at 78-80; Dodd, op. cit. supra note 35, at c. 5 and 6, esp. p. 385.
,Dodd, op. cit. supra note 35, at 417 n. 28; Cadman, op. cit. supra note 50, at 21-27.
' Dodd, op. cit. supra note 35, at 316.
Ibid., at 317, 449. The first state constitution to prohibit special incorporation was that
of Louisiana adopted in 1845. By 1860, twelve states had similar provisions. 2 Evans, Busi-
ness Incorporations in the United States 11 (1948).
1 Cadman, op. cit. supra note.50, at 207-8. The same was true in Maine. Evans, op. cit.
supra note 66, at 12.
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laws had become so easy and frequent that the old complaint against "monop-
olistic corporations" could no longer be sustained.
The distrust of corporations did not evaporate with the old complaint; after
the middle of the nineteenth century new grounds were found for believing
that corporations were monopolistic, and criticisms that had been subordinate
now became prominent. They achieved their new importance partly because
the fundamental American attitude toward government was changing at this
time. The fear of oligarchy, which had been carried over from the colonial
period and so carefully expressed in the Constitution, was subsiding. The fear
of plutocracy, always present in some degree, grew sharper as Americans rec-
ognized the rapid growth of national wealth during and after the Civil War.
Reasoning about monopolies accommodated itself to the new disposition: it
was less often argued that monopolists would abolish representative govern-
ment and more often they would use their wealth to make it serve their own
interests. A great deal began to be said about the opulence of corporations. A
Justice of the Supreme Court spoke in 1853 of "the vast amount of property,
power, and exclusive benefits, prejudicial to other classes of society, that are
vested in and held by these numerous bodies of associated wealth." 68 After
the Civil War this idea became increasingly common, and frequent warnings
were heard of "the rapid concentration of the whole political, commercial, and
financial interests of the country in corporations and other monopolies." 69
The chief attacks on monopolies after the Civil War became more specific.
They were no longer directed at incorporation itself or corporations in the
mass, but more particularly against certain practices, above all economic
abuses, that were attributed to some corporations. No one could by this time
reasonably want or hope to solve the problem by abolishing corporations or
by making it easier to establish more of them. The idea began, therefore, to
spread that the power and injurious behavior of monopolistic corporations
should be controlled by government regulation.
Agitation for anti-monopoly laws was first led by the Grangers or Patrons
of Husbandry. Founded two years after the Civil War and at first intended to
serve the social and educational needs of farmers, it soon became involved in
economic and political activities. By 1871, its founder reported that "'Co-
operation' and 'Down with monopolies' were proving popular watchwords" 7°--
indeed by 1875, when the Grange reached its peak, it had brought within its
ranks at least one of every ten American farmers. 71 "Cooperation" meant
Catron, J., mi Ohio Life Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. (U.S.) 416, 422 (1853).
Cloud, Monopolies and the People 259 (1873).
'o Buck, The Granger Movement 52-53 (1913).
71 Ibid., at 58. As of October 1875, the Grangers claimed 758,767 members; the agricul-
tural population at that time, according to the United States census and Buck's estimate,
was about 6,800,000.
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organization of farmers' cooperatives, while "Down with monopolies" meant
principally regulation of railroads. Granger opposition to railroads and
monopolies was expressed in a host of manifestoes, declarations, petitions and
statements, of which the resolutions adopted by an Illinois Farmers' Conven-
tion in 1873 were fairly typical. The first two stated "that all chartered
monopolies, not regulated and controlled by law, have proved detrimental to
the public prosperity, corrupting in their management, and dangerous to re-
publican institutions," and "that the railways of the world, except in those
countries where they have been held under the strict regulation and super-
vision of the government, have proved themselves arbitrary, extortionate and
as opposed to free institutions and free commerce between states as were the
feudal barons of the middle ages."72 The traditional theme, that monopolies
are dangerous to liberty, was there as always, but with it a contemporary vari-
ation: the only cure is regulation by law. The resolutions went on to propose
particular laws that would fix "reasonable maximum rates" and impose various
other restrictions and duties on railroads. In a number of midwestern and
western states, especially Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, Grangers
founded or supported independent parties-usually armed with the name
"Anti-Monopoly"--that advocated railroad legislation of this sort. For a few
years before 1875 they were surprisingly successful in having such laws enact-
ed by the states,73 but various difficulties prevented the laws from having any
great effect, and indeed the railroad problem remained a leading aspect of the
monopoly question until long after the Sherman Act was passed. Although
the Grange had lost much of its power by 1880, it had served to stimulate
a revival of anti-monopoly sentiments which had been obscured by the more
dramatic events of the Civil War.
Reformers with rather broader interests succeeded the Grange as leading
anti-monopolists during the early 1880's, and in their hands "monopoly" was
a brush that could tar many rich or exclusive institutions. One crusader con-
demned as monopolistic not only railroads, banks, and public utility com-
panies, but also speculative dealing in grains, restrictive licensing of busi-
nesses and professions, laws limiting the ballot to males, and "those nurseries
of caste"--West Point and Annapolis. 74 John Jameson, a Chicago judge,
speaking before the Illinois Bar Association in 1882, described as one of
America's gravest problems the accumulation of capital into the "great
moneyed institutions"--private corporations-that are "commonly stigma-
tized as monopolies." He gave three principal examples: the railroad corpora-
tion, typical form of the evil; the giant wheat farms of the northwest, which
he described as novel, though his complaint echoed the cry of "land monopoly"
Periam, The Groundswell 286 (1874).
Buck, op. dt. supra note 70, at c. 3.
' Bland, The Reign of Monopoly (1881).
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that had been raised often before against speculators and absentee owners;
and. the "monster business establishments, owned by private individuals, of
Which the Standard Oil Company is the best known type."7 5 General Ben
Butler, presidential candidate of the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties
in 18S4, declared his hostility to monopolists in commerce, industries, and
lands, and singled out the railroads that charged excessive rates, the sewing-
machine monopoly, which derived its power from a patent, and the Standard
Oil Company.7 6
Many other companies and institutions were attacked as monopolies during
the years after 1880, but more and more attention was devoted to combina-
tions of industrial firms, all of which, however organized, came by the end of
the decade to be called trusts. Public prominence was achieved first by the
Standard Oil Company, which by 1880 controlled much of the country's
petroleum refining. Thereafter it became a favorite butt of the anti-monopo-
lists, none of whom castigated it more loudly than Henry Demarest Lloyd.
His article, "The Story of a Great Monopoly," was so well received that the
Atlantic Monthly had to reprint its issue for March, 1881, six times.77 In
1882, Standard Oil adopted the trust device, and the effectiveness of this
method, for making combinations permanently cohesive and easily manage-
able recommended it to others. The next. two groupsr to use it were also oil
businesses, whether by an association of ideas or because, "as some thought,
they were actively encouraged by Standard Oil.7 8 The Cotton.Oil Trust was
organized in 1884 and the Linseed Oil Trust in the following year. The former
is'.said to have angered Southern farmers and to have strengthened the de-
mand for a. federal antitrust law; at the very least it provoked the-Attorney-
General of Louisiana to proceed against it in the state courts7 9'
- Trust-building did not begin in earnest until 1887, but then it. took hold
quickly. That year saw the formation of the Sugar and Whisky Trusts,
which until the end of the century contended for unpopularity only with
Standard Oil. Others, affecting lesser industries or smaller markets, added
to the list, which by the end of the year included the Envelope, Salt, Cordage,
Oil-Cloth, Paving-Pitch, School-Slate, Chicago Gas, St. Louis Gas and New
York Meat trusts. When, in November, the president of the Paper-Bag Trust
explained that trust-making was "the tendency of the times," his statement
".-'aSJameson, The Grounds and Limits of Rightful Interference by Law with the Accumula-
tibn b~nd Use of Capital'1-7 (1882).
." Butler, Speech of Aug. 30, 1884, appended to his pamphlet, Address to His Constituents,
Aug.,A2, 188+.
- ' Clark, The Federal Trust Policy 17 (1931).
Cook, Trusts 3 (1888).
' Clark, op. cit. supra note 77, at 4 n. 5. The proceedings were begun in April 1887 and
judgment given later in the year. Louisiana v. American Cotton-Oil Trust, 1 Ry. & Corp.
LJ. 509 (1887).
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was not treated as startling news.80 Nor, if we are to credit the judgment of
most contemporary observers, was the public' uncertain 'about how well it
liked the trusts: it seems to have had no difficulty in identifying them as the
latest version of monopoly and in transferring to them the antipathy which by
long usage it had cultivated against all monopolies.
The great fervor against trusts in 1888, which bursts so unexpectedly on an
historian like Clark, was for the people living at the time nothing so sudden
or strange. It was simply a familiar feeling raised to a high pitch, intense be-
cause the speed with which new trusts were being hatched made it seem that
they would overrun everything unless some remedy were found soon. The
general disposition of the public was not in doubt. There were numerous ob:
jections to the trusts-complaints of a traditional sort as well as newer ones
suited to the character of these particular monopolies. Trusts, it was said,
threatened liberty, because they corrupted civil servants and bribed legisla-
tors; they enjoyed privileges such as protection by tariffs; they drove out
competitors by lowering prices, victimized consumers by raising prices, de-
frauded investors by watering stocks, put laborers out of work by closing
down plants, and somehow or other abused everyone. The kind of remedy
that the public desired was also clear enough: it wanted a law to destroy the
power of the trusts. The alternative suggestion that government should take
over the trusts and operate them as public property seems to have had scant
support. But the desire was not, and, in the nature of public opinion, could
not be expressed in much greater detail. Any law might be acceptable if it
really suppressed the worst abuses of the trusts, especially of those like th e
Standard Oil, Sugar, and Whisky Trusts, that were most noticeable and
most important in the everyday life of many people. The public's mandate was
clear, but so broad that Congress had to look elsewhere for advice on how to
implement- it.
II
Expert judgment on how to solve the trust problem would naturally be ex-
pected from the two professions most closely concerned with it, the econ-
omists and the lawyers.
The general opinion of American economists during the years after 1885
was easier for legislators and the public to detect because the American Eco-
nomic Association, which had just been formed, could be regarded as its official
spokesman. A first attempt to organize a professional society had been made
shortly after 1880 by Edmund James and Simon Nelson Patten, who had
come to teach in the Wharton School of Finance after completing their studies
in Germany. Following German models they had observed as students, they
proposed a Society for the Study of National Economy. Since they believed
'N.Y. Times p. 4, col. 5 (Nov. 7, 1887).
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that competition had very serious shortcomings as the basis of economic life,81
they suggested that the aim of the Society should be
To combat the widespread view that our economic problems will solve themselves,
and that our laws and institutions which at present favor individual instead of collec-
tive action can promote the best utilization of our material resources and secure to
each individual the highest development of all his faculties.82
In keeping with this aim, they suggested the Society should favor positive
government intervention in economic life, particularly by means of federal
aid to education, forest conservation, mineral surveys and agricultural ex-
periment stations.83 For one reason or another the proposal did not mature,
and in 1885 Richard Ely made a fresh start. He circulated a statement set-
ting forth the principles on which an American Economic Association should
be based and outlining a platform that curiously blended the optimism, zeal,
piety, and objectivity typical of younger economists of the time. It stated that
economics was an immature science which could be improved greatly by
statistical and historical research, intimated that the conflict between labor
and capital could be resolved by the "united efforts of Church, state and
science," and recommended that the Association avoid taking partisan posi-
tions on any matter of public policy and especially on the tariff question. But
the essence of the program, virtually the same as that suggested by James
and Patten,8 4 was stated in its first principle:
We regard the state as an educational and ethical agency whose positive aid is an
indispensable condition of human progress. While we recognize the necessity of in-
dividual initiative in industrial life, we hold that the doctrine of laissez-faire is unsafe
in politics and unsound in morals; and that it suggests an inadequate explanation of
the relations between the state and the citizens.85
This thesis was the main subject of discussion at the founding convention.
Ely defended it. Others urged that it be modified; John Bates Clark, for in-
stance, thought that "the point upon which individuals will be unable to unite
is, especially, the strong condemnation of the laissez-faire doctrine."8 6 Follow-
ing a long debate the platform was finally revised, and the new version omitted
the explicit denunciation though it retained the fairly safe assertion that the
state is indispensable to human progress.s7 This refusal to denounce laissez-
faire did not mean that the charter members of the Economic Association en-
' E.g., Patten, The Premises of Political Economy (1885).
'Ely, Ground Under Our Feet 132, 296 (1938).
- Ibid., 296-99.
-Ibid., at 135.
'Ely, Report on the Organization of the American Economic Association, 1 Pub. Am.
Econ. Ass'n, No. 1, 6-7 (1886).
-Ibid., at 29. Ibid., at 20, 35 (passim).
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dorsed it. Most of them were evidently as skeptical as Ely, but they did not
want to make a formal declaration that might suggest they favored socialism.
In fact they preferred a middle, "balanced" position between liberalism and
interventionism, between what they called the "English" and "German"
views,88 in short, a distinctively "American" economic policy.8 9 They conclud-
ed that as the "English" school believed competition was necessarily benefi-
cial while the "German" school considered it inherently harmful, they them-
selves ought to regard it as a mixed blessing. Edwin Seligman said as much at
the founding convention: "Competition is not in itself bad. It is a neutral
force which has already produced immense benefits, but which may, under
certain conditions, bring in its train sharply defined evils." 90 His colleagues
agreed; their eagerness to construct a native economic policy increased their
interest in what was anyway an important economic phenomenon, and many
turned their energies to discovering when competition was useful and when it
was inferior to combination or monopoly.
In order to judge the desirability of combination, they needed first to ex-
plain it. But this did not strike them as a particularly difficult task, for al-
though they regarded the great wave of industrial combination as a new phe-
nomenon, they were not surprised by it. Like many informed men of their time,
they were convinced that Darwin's laws governed the evolution of human so-
ciety, the social organism, no less rigorously than that of biological organ-
isms. 91 Any social change in which they could detect "growth" or "centrali-
zation" struck them as "natural"; and as the combination-trust, pool, or
syndicate-was an organization that many producers, who formerly went
their own separate ways, formed in order to act jointly, they regarded it as
an evolutionary advance. Combination was inevitable, an instance of the
general law which ordained, as one writer put it, that "corporate action is
ready to overshadow personal action. '92 The economists moreover could ex-
plain the inevitability of combination as the particular effect of technical
progress. According to Davis Ames Wells, one of the most prominent econo-
mists of the older generation, the successful adoption of steam-driven machin-
ery had made manufacturing so efficient that "industrial overproduction" re-
Ibid., at 21.
- As Ely said, ibid., at 23. Consult also, Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action,
1 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass'n No. 6, 29 (1887) ; Walker, Recent Progress of Political Economy in
the United States, 4 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass'n 245 (1889).
90 Ely, op. cit. supra note 82, at 27.
' Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (1949) ; Hofstadter, Social Darwin-
ism in American Thought (1944). Ely later wrote: "The most fundamental things in our
mind were the ideas of evolution and of relativity. I think that those two ideas were unan-
imously held by those who founded the American Economic Association." The Founding
and Early History of the American Economic Association, 26 Am. Econ. Rev. Supp. 141, 144
(1936).
"Bascom, Social Harmony, 40 Independent 419, 420 (1888).
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sulted; a strenuous effort to' sell unwanted goods had led to "excessive com-
petition"; manufacturing firms were losing money, and could only correct the
difficulty if they combined to reduce their output.93 John Bates Clark, the
best of the younger economists and not the most Darwinian of them, held
much the same view:
Combinations have their roots in the nature of social industry and are normal in
their origin, their development, and their practical working. They are neither' to be
deprecated by scientists nor suppressed by legislators. They are the result of an evolu-
tion, and are the happy outcome of a competition so abnormal that the continuance
of it would have meant widespread ruin. A successful attempt to suppress them by
law would involve the reversion of industrial systems to a cast-off type, the renewal
of abuses from which society has escaped by a step in development.94
Economists as different in spirit as Patten and Sumner agreed that improved
transportation had been important in bringing about combinations.95 Ely
thought that "owing to discoveries and inventions, especially the application
of steam to industry and transportation, it became necesary to prosecute en-
terprises of gfeat magnitude." 96 And since the economists assumed that com-
bination was the only way to correct excessive competition and the chaotic
economic conditions that they thought it produced, as weL : the most prac-
ticable way to get the positive advantages of large-scale production, they con-
cluded that it was not only inevitable but in many instances beneliLial.97
.Nor did economists attribute such advantages only to combinations: they
were adopting a theory which led them to conclude that even outright mo-
nopolies, or at least some of them, were also inevitable and potentially benefi-
cial. This theory was by no means new, having been outlined by several great
English economists earlier in the century,98 but American economists of this
generation were especially struck by it on reading the monograph, Relation of
the State to Industrial Action, which their colleague, Henry Carter Adams,
published in 1887.99 Adams distinguished three classes of industries according
to the size that firms within them would naturally attain. In "industries of
t Wells, Recent Economic Changes c. 1-3, p. 74 (1889).
"Clark, The Limits of Competition, reprinted in Clark and Giddings, The Modern Dis-
tributive Process 11 (1888).
"Patten, The Principles of Rational Taxation 5-7 (1890); Sumner, Trusts and Trade
Unions, 40 Independent 482, 483 (1888).
Ely, The Nature and Significance of Corporations, 75 Harper's Magazine 71, 75 (1887).
This view had become more or less standard in the business community as well. See for
an example, the testimony of Francis Thurber, an important commodity broker, before the
New York State Senate Committee on Trusts, reported in 5 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 20 (1889).
'E.g., Senior, Outline of the Science of Political Economy 81 et seq. (reprint. 1938)
(1834); Mill, Principles of Political Economy Bk. I, c. 2, § 2, 444 (Ashley's ed., 1909)
(1848).
"Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 Pub. Am. Econ Ass'n No 6, 55-60
(1887).
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constant returns," every unit of capital and labor used in production yields
equal quantities of output; a new firm in such an industry, say a new retail
grocery, can sell its goods as cheaply as any older and larger store; and there-
fore competition can never fail to keep prices in such an industry from being
exorbitant. In the second class, "industries of diminishing returns," small
firms are more efficient than large ones because each additional unit of capital
and labor produces a smaller quantity of goods; Adams cited agriculture as
the typical industry of this sort, and concluded that individual interest will
always maintain a large number of small producers in such industries. But in
the third class, "industries of increasing returns," the opposite is true: since
each successive unit of input produces more than the last, the largest firm is
the most efficient and can eventually drive out all competitors. Industries of
increasing returns, Adams concluded, must inevitably be controlled by mo-
nopolies.
Having decided that some combinations and all natural monopolies were
inevitable, the economists did not hesitate to conclude that any attempt to
prohibit them by law reflected the outworn belief "in the universal existence
and beneficence of free competition."'10 0 Adams maintained that the only ques-
tion of policy was whether an industry of increasing returns should become
an "irresponsible, extra-legal monopoly, or a monopoly established by law and
managed in the interest of the public."''1 The public interest could be pro-
tected only by government intervention, but he was not sure which particular
method would be most effective, whether the work should be done "through
carefully guarded franchises, through official commissions, through competi-
tion of the state with private industries, or through direct government manage-
ment." °2 Ely, who with many of his prominent colleagues immediately adopt-
ed Adams' theory of natural monopolies, lOs was of two minds, because though
in the abstract he preferred public ownership, especially municipal ownership
of public utilities, he conceded that a system of control by limited charters
and taxation might be more readily established.10 4 Others, like Hadley,
thought it would be best to subject all monopolies to some scheme of regula-
tion like that imposed by state railroad laws, "under which the necessity for
combination was at least tacitly admitted, but where the combinations were
held to a larger degree of publicity and responsibility than before"; 0 5 they
did not, however, specify the rules of such a scheme.
10 Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law, 2 Pol. Sci. Q. 374 (1887).
"Adams, op. cit. supra note 99, at 64. - Ibid., at 53.
'Ely, Nature and Significance of Corporations, 75 Harper's Magazine 259, 261 (1887);
Hadley, Private Monopolies and Public Rights, 1 Q. J. Econ. 40 (1887) ; James, Relation of
the Modem Municipality to'the Gas Supply, 1 Pub. Am. Econ. Ass'n 29 et seq. (1886).
Ely, Problems of Today 129-30, 189-94 (1890).
Hadley, op. cit. supra note 103, at 44. Consult also his speech reported in N.Y. Times
p. 1, col. 2 (Feb. 6, 1888) ; Seligman, op. cit. supra note 100, at 374.
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Although they differed as to the exact action government should take,
nearly all the economists were convinced that any attempt to prohibit com-
binations would be either unnecessary or futile. Since many of the trusts were
"natural," the law could not destroy them: "If," as Adams summarized this
view, "it is for the interest of men to combine no law can make them com-
pete."10 6 Those trusts, on the other hand, that were "artificial" could be de-
stroyed by withdrawing the tariffs and other legal privileges that protected
them, or by regulating the natural monopolies that created them-Ely, when
discussing the latter method, had in mind for instance the rebates and extraor-
dinarily low rates which railroads were supposed to have granted the Stand-
ard Oil Company. 0 7 Moreover, some economists argued, any combination
that was not justified by the underlying conditions of its industry would de-
cay of its own accord or be controlled by what came to be called "the active
influence of the potential competitor."' 08 Even when they were most vehement
in denying English "laissez-faire" or the "orthodox" theories of the older
American school, the economists granted that competition was inevitable and
beneficial in some industries. But they insisted that in other industries com-
bination was equally inevitable and beneficial. Younger and older economists
alike agreed with Wells' judgment that "Society has practically abandoned-
and from the very necessity of the case has got to abandon, unless it pro-
poses to war against progress and civilization-the prohibition of industrial
concentrations and combinations."' 1 9 Wells went on to say that:
The problem, therefore, which society under this condition of affairs has presented
to it for solution is a difficult one, and twofold in its nature. To the producer the
question of importance is, How can competition be restricted to an extent sufficient
to prevent its injurious excesses? To the consumer, How can combination be re-
stricted so as to secure its advantages and at the same time curb its abuses?" o
He offered no solution to the problem, nor indeed did the economists as a
group. They insisted that the government must somehow allow both competi-
tion and combination to play their proper parts in economic life, that it must
regulate both, that it could not reasonably prohibit either, but beyond this
they offered no unified or precise suggestion about the law Congress should
pass.
The legal profession was more apt to suggest means that Congress might
use in solving the trust problem, since most lawyers believed that laws could
'Adams, op. cit. supra note 99, at 64.
'-, Ely, op. cit. supra note 104, at c. 3, esp. 201.
'o Gunton, The Economic and Social Aspects of Trusts, 3 Pol. Sci. Q. 385, 403 (1888);
Clark, The "Trust," 52 New Englander 223 (1890).
"Wells, op. cit. supra note 93, at 74-75.
Ibid.
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prohibit monopolies. Indeed they thought that the common law already did
so, although their conviction rested on a somewhat tenuous basis. There was
no question that the common law had at various times condemned monopolies,
or more often, behavior which was supposed to be monopolistic. There were
many precedents to this effect in the bodies of law concerning chartered
monopolies, forestalling and engrossing, contracts in restraint of trade and
combinations in restraint of trade. Nevertheless, it was doubtful whether the
common law was powerful enough in 1888 to destroy the monopolies of that
time. Yet many lawyers felt sure that it embodied a spirit unalterably op-
posed to monopoly and that this spirit-the "public policy" of the law-would
somehow prevail against any trust it encountered. The only problem they ad-
mitted was how to enforce and strengthen the common law.Of the four branches of common law particularly concerned with monopoly,
two had hardly any direct bearing on the trust problem. The common law con-
cerning chartered monopolies, which had been used in England during the
seventeenth century to destroy or weaken monopolies created by the Crown,"1
had little force as precedent in nineteenth-century American courts. More-
over it had no relevance to the trusts. The editor of one contemporary law
journal wrote that "the word, 'monopoly,' in its only legal sense means an
exclusive right to deal in and sell certain articles,... guaranteed ... by posi-
tive law.""112 Though it was an exaggeration to insist that "monopoly" still
bad an unequivocal legal sense,"13 it was undoubtedly true that trusts could
not be condemned under this branch of the common law since their monopo-
listic power had not been granted by government.
The body of common law that prohibited engrossing had no more direct
bearing on the modem monopoly problem. It had grown out of English cases
and statutes against practices whereby merchants evaded the regulations of
medieval markets: "forestalling,"-buying or selling outside the market place
or before it officially opened; "regrating," or buying and selling goods in the
same market; "engrossing," or buying up large quanities of a good in order
to sell it at raised prices; and a series of similar methods by which middlemen,
as it was supposed, made a parasitic living. Although in England, under the
influence of free-trade ideas, this body of law was repealed,114 in the United
States it persisted. The ancient definitions of the crimes were forgotten, but
"engrossing" came to mean cornering the supply of a commodity, "monopo-
lizing" came to serve as a synonym for it, and in a few scattered cases Ameri-
can courts judged it illegal.1 5 There was accordingly some point in declaring,
I Consult Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 355, 356-67 (1954).
' 27 Cen. L.J. 205 (1888). "' Discussion infra at 244.
"'Letwin, op. cit. supra note 111, at 367-73.
' Consult, Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 246 (1917).
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as one lawyer did in 1889, that the trusts "literally engross, to borrow a word
from the common law, the market in respect of the particular commodity," 116
though using the common law word did not prove that trusts were prohibited
by American common law as it stood in 1888. There was much sounder his-
torical evidence for maintaining, as did Theodore Dwight, Dean of the Colum-
bia Law School, that the common law against engrossing was practically ex-
tinct; but he weakened his case by adding the disingenuous argument that
the trusts could not be accused of engrossing, because a necessary part of that
crime was the intent to raise prices, and the trusts had no purpose except
the laudable one "to regulate prices and keep them steady' 17 Moreover, as
Dwight emphasized, even supposing that the law against engrossing retained
any vigor, it could hardly be used against trusts in general. Engrossing was
traditionally a crime only if it affected food, or later, "necessaries of life," and
although the definition of "necessity" had been broadened by American courts,
it did not include many commodities in which trusts might deal.118
. Although the common law against contracts in restraint of trade was dis-
tinctly more alive and more pertinent to the activities of trusts, it too was
incapable of destroying them. Although such contracts were at first altogether
condemned by common law, in time more and more of them were permitted,
until, after the early eighteenth century, lawyers assumed they were valid if
the restraint were "partial"-if the person undertaking the obligation not to
engage in a certain business were excluded only from a small area and only
for a short time. 1 9 Some American lawyers during the 1880's thought this
rule-that all "general" restraints were void-still governed the decisions of
American courts.' 20 Others were beginning to believe that the true test was
whether the restraint was "reasonable," and that the courts would consider
unreasonable any restraint broader than the party imposing it needed or
than the interest of the public could tolerate. 2 1 There are good grounds for
believing, as Dwight evidently did,'22 that the test of reasonableness was
rather more lenient than the older one and that by 1888 even the older one
might permit almost any restraint. Dwight cited as chief evidence the case of
" The Theory of a Trust, 23 Am. L. Rev. 103 (1889).
' Dwight, The Legality of "Trusts," 3 Pol. Sd, Q. 592, 594, 609-10 (1888).
'A catalogue of commodities that American courts classified as necessities was given by
Boisot, The Legality of Trust Combinations, 39 (N.S. 30) Am. L. Reg. 751, 762 (1891).
Consult also, Allen, Criminal Conspiracies in Restraint of Trade at Common Law, 23 Harv.
L. Rev. 531, 543, 547 (1910).
" Letwin, op. cit. supra note 111, at 373-77.
"'Kerr, Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 22 Am. L. Rev. 873 (1888).
"McQuillan, Validity of Contracts in Restiaint of Trade, 33 (N.S. 24) Am. L. Reg. 217,
281 (1885) ; Eaton, On Contracts in Restraint of Trade, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 128 (1890) ; Letwin,
op. cit. supra note 111, at 373-79.
' Dwight, op. cit. supra note 117, at 610-11; cf. Letwin, op. cit. supra note 111, at 378-79.
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MDamond Match Co. v. Roeber,12 3 which decided that a contract to restrain
Roeber from engaging in the match business anywhere in the United States,
except Nevada and Montana, was still "partial" and therefore valid. 2 4 The
courts' willingness to uphold rather broad restraints was only one reason for
doubting that this body of common law could damage the trusts. A more im-
portant reason was that such contracts could be brought before the courts only
by parties to them. If trusts were to be attacked by this means either they
themselves or those who did business with them would have to initiate the
action, and there were few instances of this kind. No outsider could attack such
a contract, no public official could bring a suit to have it declared void, and a
court could at most invalidate the contested agreement. There was little hope
of destroying trusts in this way.
Nor were the trusts likely to be destroyed by the common law on combina-
tions in restraint of trade. This body of law prohibited some, but only some,
of the agreements by which a number of producers combined to reduce com-
petition, either by setting uniform prices, fixing production quotas, dividing
the market into exclusive dealing areas, or pooling their profits. The principle
by which American courts distinguished between legal and illegal combina-
tions was rather obscure, though they seemed to consider void any agreement
that was "part of a conspiracy to create a monopoly."'125 There was enough
doubt so that a lawyer well-disposed toward the trusts could argue that the
courts were beginning to be more lenient toward industrial combinations,1 26
while one of the leading opponents of the trusts could maintain that even the
decisions which appeared lenient really sustained the severity of the prin-
ciple.12 7 However, the main defect of this branch of the law, considered as an
antitrust device, was that the courts could decide cases involving combinations
only when brought by persons who belonged to, or did business with, a com-
bination. No public official could start proceedings to dissolve a combination
or to punish its members'. 28
106 N.Y. 473 (1887).
" Dwight, op. cit. supra note 117, at 607.
'Marsh v. Russell, 66 N.Y. 288, 291 (1876). This doctrine seems to have been followed
equally in cases where the combination was held valid and in those where it was not: Central
Shade Roller Co. v. Cushman, 143 Mass. 353 (1887); Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo.
App. 522 (1880); Craft. v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875). Consult, Allen, op. cit. supra
note 118.
"Dwight, op. cit. supra note 117, at 608-9. As evidence that the courts were becoming
lenient he cited two English cases, Wickens v. Evans, 3 Y. & J. 318 (1829). and Collins v.
Locke, 4 L.R.A.C. 674 (1879). The American cases would not have supported this argument
so clearly.
Cook, Trusts 27 .(1888). Cook was the author of a frequently quoted treatise on the
Law of Stock and Stockholders, and was on a committee of well-known lawyers who,
drafted an antitrust bill for the N.Y. state legislature. 3 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 121 (1888).
' Allen, op. cit. supra note 118.
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Although none of these branches of the common law was sufficiently power-
ful to be used in an active campaign to destroy the trusts, all of them together
convinced lawyers that the law opposed monopolies. It had once prohibited
chartered monopolies, it still prohibited "engrossing" or "monopolizing," "gen-
eral" or "total" restraints of trade and combinations "tending toward mo-
nopoly." On the basis of such precedents judges had constructed the theory
that the "public policy" embodied in the common law opposed monopoly.129
This doctrine had become firmly established among lawyers, 30 and it was not
denied even by those who disapproved of it. The very lawyers who insisted
that the trust was not an illegal form of organization usually argued that
nothing about the nature of the trust made it necessarily monopolistic, and in
doing so they conceded that any trust which was a monopoly would probably
be illegal. 31
To say that monopolies were illegal at common law was one thing, to de-
stroy them by using the common law was another. It was true that in at least
three prominent instances between 1887 and 1890 courts judging private
suits refused to uphold agreements in restraint of trade.132 Such results were
comforting indications of "the tendency of the judicial mind," as one contem-
porary law journal put it, 3 3 but they were clearly not enough to put an end
to the trust problem. Active prosecution of trusts was needed, and indeed a
few public officials managed to do it. If they could not sue monopolies in any
other way, they could and did use the legal weapons provided by their power
over corporations. Between 1887 and 1890 the attorneys-general of five
A few of the opinions in which judges held that public policy favored competition are:
Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880) ; India Bagging Ass'n v. Kock & Co.
14 La. An. 164 (1859); Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio (N.Y.) 434 (1848). Consult also, Green-
hood, The Doctrine of Public Policy, 674-75, 685-89 (1886). An example of the tendency to
identify a "general restraint of trade" with "monopoly" appears in Skrainka v. Scharring-
hausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 (1880).
mo Cook, op. cit. supra note 127, at 28; Kerr, op. cit. supra note 120, at 879; McQuillan,
op. cit. supra note 121, at 227; Mickey, Trusts, 22 Am. L. Rev. 538, 544, 547 (1888).
"'Dwight, op. cit. supra note 117; Beach, editorial, 3 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 217, 219 (1888);
Abbott, 34 Daily Register 484, 572 (1888), cited and criticizedin 22 Am. L. Rev. 926 (1888);
Dodd, 5 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 98 (1889); Heinsheimer, The Legal Status of Trusts, 2 Columbia
L. Times 51 (1828).
"2In Chicago Gas Co. v. People's Gas Co., 121 Ill. 530 (1887), the court refused to en-
force an agreement by which two gas companies partitioned Chicago into two exclusive
markets; it considered the contract a partial restraint, but invalid because the parties were
engaged in public service. In Mallory v. Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. 598 (1888), the court
would not enforce a combination of five cottonseed oil manufacturers, because whether or
not it was a monopoly, its members were corporations and had no proper authority for par-
ticipating in a partnership. In Richardson v. Buhl, 77 Mich. 632 (1889), the court would
not enforce a contract between organizers of the Diamond Match Co. on the ground that
any contract for the formation of a monopoly was illegal.
'25 Cen. L.J. 482 (1887), referring to Chicago Gas Co. v. People's Gas Co., 121 Ill. 530
(1887).
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states,134 more or less enthusiastically' 35 initiated suits to dissolve corpora-
tions that exceeded their chartered powers, or to destroy associations that ex-
ercised corporate powers without having charters. Most of the lawyers who
insisted on the legality of trusts argued that they were either unincorporated
joint-stock companies or partnerships of shareholders, both perfectly lawful
forms of organization.13 The public prosecutors set out to prove the opposite,
and in every case they won.' 37 The reactions to these cases were mixed. Some
lawyers felt that this sort of attack might solve the problem: they hailed one
decision as a "crushing" blow, another as a "setback" for the trusts, a third
as a "victory" for the people, and concluded that at least in New York the
trust had received its "judicial quietus."' 38 Others were less certain that the
solution was general: they pointed out that the Louisiana decision would not
be followed elsewhere since other states did not prohibit joint-stock com-
panies, 13 9 and that the Illinois decision was not a blow against trusts because
the defendant, the Chicago Gas Trust Company, was not properly speaking
a trust but a corporation.1 40 But in any case, few monopolies had been de-
stroyed in this way by 1890.
Still, these few recent attacks on monopolies, together with the current
view that the common law expressed a public policy hostile to monopolies,
made lawyers confident that the common law went in the right direction. Some
' In Louisiana v. American Cotton-Oil Trust, 1 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 509 (1887), the court
declared the trust unlawful, because it was not a corporation and the state's statutes forbade
joint-stock companies. In People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 268 (1889), the court
held that the Company must sell the stocks it owned of four other gas companies, because
its corporate charter did not give authority to operate other corporations or to form a mo-
nopoly. In California v. American Sugar Refining Co., 7 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 83 (1890), the
court dissolved the corporation on the ground that it had forfeited its franchise by sur-
rendering its business to the Sugar Trust. In People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121
N.Y. 582 (1890) aff'g 22 Abb. N.C. (N.Y.) 164 (1889), the court dissolved the corporation
because it exceeded its chartered powers by entering a combination, the Sugar Trust, which
moreover was a monopoly. In State v. Nebraska Distilling Co., 29 Neb. 700 (1890), the
court annulled the franchise of the corporation because in selling out to the Whisky Trust
it had made an unlawful contract.
'w The New York sugar case (People v. North River Sugar Refining Co., 121 N.Y. 582
(1890)) was called a "Tammany Hall suit," 4 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 241 (1888), and was part of
a Democratic campaign to make capital of the trust question, 5 Ry. & Corp. L.. 53 (1889).
The Chicago Gas case (People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 11. 268 (1889)), was prosecuted
by Attorney General Hunt, at the instance of the Chicago Citizen's Association. His first
reaction to their suggestion was that he could not bring the case without "backing" and that
he had no money to pay for collecting evidence. Chi. Trib. p. 6, col. 5 (Feb. 3, 1888).
"'Consult authors cited note 131 supra.
mSee note 134 supra.
'" Comments on the La. decision, 29 Cen. L.J. 41 (1889) ; Cal., 30 Cen. L.J. 69 (1890);
M11., 24 Am. L. Rev. 143 (1890) ; N.Y., Albany LJ., quoted in 5 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 144 (1889).
'-Mickey, op. cit. supra note 130, at 542.
1A30 Cen. LJ. 2 (1890) ; 6 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 441 (1889).
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of. them thought, it went far- .enough. The members of the New York Senate
committee on trusts -were so impressed by the. North River Sugar decision
that they proposed to defer, legislation for the time being-or rather the -Re-
publican majority of the committee thought that no new law might be needed,
while the Democrats believed that'none likely to be. passed would be as favor-
able as, the common law declared in that decision.141 The editor of the Ameri-
can T.aw -Reyiew, in commenting. on Sherman's antitrust bill, said that as. the
trusts were making war on society, society was bound to make war upon
them, but concluded that society could carry on its- war without enacting
criminal statutes; "The common law isgo6d enough, if it were only adminis,
tered.1'1 42 Other lawyers,, however,-said that more force was necessary. One,
after arguing. that, the trusts, as monopolies, were prohibited-by the common
law, suddenly, ended with a warning that they could be checked only by "wisely
and.fearlessly executed legislation."'143 The editor of the Central.Law Journal,
commenting on the Tennessee case in which the, operation of the common law
dissolved a combination of cotton-oil manufacturers, nevertheless differed with
the suggestions that the common law was a sufficient weapon. The:trusts, he
said, were "vast masses of aggregated capital, completely organized, and fully
supported, by numerous corporations, many of them improvidently endowed
by their charters with extraordinary powers"'14 4 they 'were-too :pwerfl ..to
be destroyed without legislation.
Few of the lawyers who believed that statutes were needed-at least few
who wrote in legal peribdicals-suggested how the'statutes should be framed.
Oae ofthe rare proposals was' that laws be passed -to subject the trust to cor-
poratin 'aw,' and' to prohibit any* corporation from' holding stocli, in .an
other4 Thi-second hint was rather far-si'ghted, for the. author understood,
as few others- yet did,' 46 that the corporate -holding-cgmpany or merged cbr-
poration miglt.'-be mich. safer method of organizing monopolies than the
tru'st.'But thefe was a serioiis flaw in this scheme,_as in all antitrust laws pro-
posed or passed-by. the states (the Missouri antitrust law, for instance, had
already encountered it by March of 1890):x'7 the states lacked auihorit-y, to
regulate cbrporations' engag d in interstate 'comfiierce. 1t 'seemed tlI'erefore. that
-'5 'Ry. & CoipLj. 78 (1889).
'22 Am..L.-Rev. 926 (1888).':' ' -
• -Mickdy, 6Op. cit supra'noit f3o, at g49." '
. 27 Cen. L.J. 277 (1888), commenting on Mallory v..Hanaur Oil Works, 86 Tenn. $98
(1888).
" Stimson, Trusts, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 132 (1887).
"0'3o' Cn.'LJ-. 257 (1890) ; see also the remarks 'of, Senators Teller and Shermin in 21
Cong. Re'. 2,560, '2,462 (1890). All of these, however; recognized the fact'thiee year's later
than Stimson. , ... . ,
"4 Consult, 30 Cen. L.J. 1 (1890) ;. 7 Ry. & Corp. LJ. 241 (1890)., '-
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if antitrust legislation were needed, and if it were to be effective against the
largest and most powerful trusts, it must be passed by Congress.148
The lawyers and the economists offered Congress little specific help and
much conflicting advice. Yet, although the economists advocated some sort
of public regulation while the lawyers suggested nothing but prohibitory laws,
their underlying views were well adapted to each other. The economists
thought that both competition and combination should play their parts in
the economy. The lawyers saw that the common law permitted combination
in some instances and prohibited it in others. Congressmen seized on this
hidden agreement, and set out to construct a statute which by the use of com-
mon law principles would eliminate excesses but allow "healthy" competi-
tion and combination to flourish side by side.
1I
The political parties officially recognized the trust problem soon after it
arose. The third parties needed no urging; they were eager to extend the cam-
paign that the Greenback and Anti-Monopoly parties had carried on since
1880 against "land, railroad, money and other gigantic monopolies."'1 49 It
was a matter of course that the Union Labor Party, formed by a coalition of
Greenbackers, Knights of Labor, and farmer organizations, should make much
of this new opportunity, and indeed they made it one of their great causes.
The platform they adopted in the spring of 1888 concluded with the declara-
tion: "The paramount issues to be solved in the interests of humanity are
the abolition of usury, monopoly, and trusts, and we denounce the Democratic
and Republican parties for creating and perpetuating these monstrous evils."'150
The major parties were anything but anxious to appear as champions of
the trusts. The Democrats had made the appropriate general statements
against monopoly in 1880151 and 1884,152 but they had especially good reasons
for carrying these further in 1888. For one thing, they could cite the new of-
fense as additional evidence against their old enemy, protection. President
Cleveland, in his annual message to Congress at the end of 1887, said it was
"notorious" that the "combinations quite prevalent at this time, and frequent -
ly called trusts," strangled competition; he urged that action be taken against
them, and suggested that Congress reduce the customs duties protecting them
'"'Consult, 30 Cen. L.J. 1,365 (1890); 22 Am. L. Rev. 269 (1888).
" Greenback platform of 1884; a virtually identical expression appeared in their platform
of 1880, and a more expanded version in the Anti-Monopoly platform of 1884. McKee, Na-
tional Conventions and Platforms 215, 192, 224 et seq. (1901).
15Ibid., at 251. Anti-monopoly planks appeared also in the 1888 platforms of the Pro-
hibition Party and of the United Labor Party. Ibid., at 247, 252 et seq.
... Ibid., at 184. - Ibid., at 206.
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against foreign competitors.153 Moreover, the trust issue was especially useful
for appealing to farmers and laborers who might shift their vote to the third
party. Cleveland, during his term of office, opposed the easy-money and sil-
ver-coinage schemes that were supposed to be popular in the South and West,
that were advocated by the Union Labor Party'54 and supported by a wing
of his own party. As a candidate for re-election he was no more pliable, and
the Democratic national convention of 1888 was the only one between 1880
and 1896 that did not advocate silver coinage; it did not even mention the
word "silver" in its platform. The party apparently felt obliged to make up
for this somehow, and amidst sympathetic references to "the industrious free-
men of our land," "every tiller of the soil" and "the cry of American labor
for a better share in the rewards of industry," it asserted that, "Judged by
Democratic principles, the interests of the people are betrayed when, by unnec-
essary taxation, trusts and combinations are permitted to exist, which, while
unduly enriching the few that combine, rob the body of our citizens .... 155
The Republican Party had even more compelling need to condemn the
trusts. They had since 1880 achieved the reputation of being the party of the
rich, and in 1884 Ben Butler began calling them the "Party of Monopo-
lists."'156 This label became especially current after their presidential candi-
date was given a banquet by a group of businessmen, among them Gould,
Vanderbilt, and Astor, which the New York World titled "The Royal Feast of
Belshazzar Blaine and the Money Kings," and during which, it said, the "Mil-
lionaires and Monopolists" sealed their allegiance to the party.'57 A party
whose policies were subject to so crudely cynical an interpretation and which
was undoubtedly supported-as were the others-by some millionaires, must
have condemned the trusts in self-defense even if it had not objected to them
in principle. In their convention of 1888, the Republicans accordingly con-
demned "all combinations of capital, organized in trusts or otherwise, to con-
trol arbitrarily the conditions of trade among our citizens," and recommended
"such legislation as will prevent the execution of all schemes to oppress the
people by undue charges on their supplies, or by unjust rates for the trans-
portation of their products to market."' 5 8 Because they elected President Har-
rison and won decisive control of Congress in the following election, responsi-
bility for carrying out the recommendation became theirs.
Congress began to concern itself with the trust problem in January of 1888.
' 8 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 588 (1900) (Message of Dec. 6,
1887).
'McKee, op. cit. supra note 149, at 290.
Ibid., at 235.
Butler, Address to His Constituents 8 (Pamphlet of Aug. 12, 1884).
'N.Y. World p. 1 (Oct. 30, 1884).
" McKee, op. cit. supra note 149, at 241.
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The antitrust bill was brought to the floor of Congress by Senator John Sher-
man because he wanted to leave one more monument to himself. By 1888 he
was aging, at times impatient and confused, but still the most prominent and
esteemed Republican in Congress. He had served as representative for eight
years, senator for over twenty-five, and had been Secretary of the Treasury
under Hayes. He had been a candidate for the presidential nomination since
1880, and seemed finally to be winning it at the convention of 1888 until Har-
rison took the lead during the seventh ballot. Soon after this defeat he began
to take serious interest in the trust question. His seniority and experience gave
him great authority on financial questions and his recent disappointment gave
him the urge to do something memorable. He began by establishing personal
jurisdiction over the antitrust problem. The antitrust bills introduced earlier
in the year15 9 had been referred to committees, but none had yet been debated,
when, on July 10, Sherman successfully introduced a resolution directing the
Senate Committee on Finance, of which he was a ranking member, to investi-
gate all antitrust bills. 160 He maintained that the Committee would investi-
gate antitrust bills "in connection with" tariff bills, which were undoubtedly its
proper province; but this argument had its danger as well, for by stressing the
connection between trusts and tariffs he was playing into the hands of the
Democrats. He had already made this blunder when, in replying to Cleveland's
annual message, he agreed that the trusts might be fought by reducing duties
that protected them-though he then added that he knew of no trusts which
had such protection. 161 Now he was a little more on guard, and argued that
the trusts not only prevented "freedom of trade and production" but also sub-
verted the tariff system; they undermined "the policy of the Government to
protect and encourage American industries by levying duties on imported
goods.'z 62
The effect of Sherman's maneuver became evident a month later, when
Senator John Reagan, a Democrat from Texas, introduced an antitrust bill
which was read and about to be referred to committee.163 At this point Sher-
man rose to insist that according to the resolution the bill should be sent to
the Finance Committee. He maintained that this was appropriate because the
only constitutional provision enabling Congress to legislate against trusts was
the power to levy taxes: though the federal government might not be able to
attack trusts like Standard Oil, it could certainly use the taxing power to con-
' Sen. 2,906; H.R. 6,113, 6,117, 8,036, 8,054, 9,449, 10,049, 50th Cong. 1st Sess. (1888).
The bills, as well as debates directly concerned with them, are conveniently gathered in
Sen. Doc. No. 147, Bills and Debates in Congress Relating to Trusts, 57th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1903), from which, however, some relevant matter is omitted, e.g., H. R. 4,406, 50th Cong.
lst Se-. (1888).
' 19 Cong. Rec. 6,041 (1888).
19 Ibid., at 190.
'Ibid., at 6,041. 'Ibid., at 7,512.
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trol monopolies like the Sugar Trust, which were aided by tariffs. But this
doctrine was far from congenial to him, and when Senator Ransom replied
that Congress derived its jurisdiction over trusts from its constitutional power
to regulate commerce, Sherman was ready to shift ground. He answered: "I al-
ways take the revenue laws as commercial laws. They always go together, in-
terchangeably." 164 Though this may have been an accurate interpretation of
the Constitution, 165 it was less than an adequate reason for referring trust
bills to the Finance Committee rather than the Commerce Committee, but the
Senate was impressed by Sherman's determination and agreed to send Rea-
gan's bill to his committee. Sherman immediately capped the day's work by
introducing an antitrust bill of his own.' 66
His bill, unlike Reagan's, was returned in short order to the Senate floor,
where it was briefly debated and considerably amended in January, 1889.167
By now it had begun to look like a serious effort, and was honored with a long
attack by Senator James George of Mississippi, formerly a Confederate gen-
eral and Chief Justice of the state supreme court, a Democrat and fervent up-
holder of states' rights.168 George questioned both its effectiveness and consti-
tutionality. He declared that although he firmly opposed the trusts and was
eager to destroy them, he saw no hope that the bill could do so. It declared il-
legal "all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations be-
tween persons or corporations made with a view, or which tend, to prevent
full and free competition" in certain goods, or "to advance the cost to the
consumer"; 16 9 yet these words, George said, would condemn not only the
trusts and combinations but also arrangements made "for moral and defen-
sive purposes."'17 It would penalize not only the Southern farmers who had
organized a boycott against the Jute-Bag Trust, but also combinations of
farmers to raise the prices of their products and of laborers to raise their
wages, and even temperance societies whose members compacted not to use
spirits. However serious this defect-and Sherman immediately assured the
Senate that it was unintentional-the great objection to the bill was its utter
futility. The bill, as it now stood, supposed that Congress derived its power
over trusts from the commerce clause of the Constitution; it therefore out-
lawed combinations dealing in goods that had been imported from abroad or
that might "in the due course of trade" be, transported from one state to an-
other. But according to the established interpretation of the Constitution, he
Ibid.
' Consult, Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution parts 1-2 (1953).
19 Cong. Rec. 7,912 (1888).
7 20 Cong. Rec. 1,167-69 (1889).
- Ibid., at 1,459-61.
11 Ibid. 17 Ibid.
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insisted, Congress could control commerce only while goods were in the actual
process of being transported into the country or from one state to another. It
was apparent that a law punishing combinations because they dealt in goods
that might once have been imported or that might some day be sent from one
state to another was either unconstitutional, or if constitutional, then so limited
in application as to be worthless. Having ended his critique, he took a little
time to point out, with some relish, that Sherman had admitted that an anti-
trust law could not be based on the commerce power and had recognized, as he
himself would, that trusts could be controlled in a constitutional manner only
by reducing protective tariffs. 71 Sherman did not answer, and before there was
another opportunity for debate, the 50th Congress disbanded.
These preliminary skirmishes were continued during the early months of
the 51st Congress. The moment the session began Sherman introduced a
bill that, except for changes in detail, contained the words and principles of his
previous drafts. It declared unlawful and void all combinations preventing
competition in foreign and interstate commerce; it authorized any person in-
jured by such combinations to recover damages; and it subjected all members
and agents of such combinations to fine and imprisonment."7' The bill, intro-
duced on December 4, 1889, and very slightly amended by the Finance Com-
mittee, was brought to the floor of the Senate in February 1890, whereupon
Senator George once again made a full-scale attack on it. He repeated his pre-
vious objections, and as before concluded that the bill was "utterly unconsti-
tutional, and even if constitutional, utterly worthless.""'8 The matter was left
there, and it began to look as though antitrust legislation was a dim prospect.
More than two years had passed since the first bills had been put before Con-
gress, and as yet only one had been briefly considered. The machinery seemed
to have come to a standstill. Two other bills in the Senate, introduced by
George and Reagan, were still being held up by committees, as were seventeen
bills that had been introduced by representatives. :74 It was rumored that the
reason for the delay since December was that McKinley, chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, was thinking of attaching an antitrust
section to his tariff bill,: 75 which had already been passed by the House and
=Ibid. . Sen. 1, 51st Cong. 1st Sess. (1889).
' 21 Cong. Rec. 1,765-7-2 (1890). v
"'Sherman's Resolution (see text at note 160 supra) having expired with the end of the
50th Congress, Reagan's bill (Sen. 62, 51st Cong. 1st Sess:, [1889]) was-referred to the Judici-
ary Committee, but George's bill (Sen. 6, 51st Cofig. 1st Sess. [1889]) was sent to the Finance
Committee. Of the bills in the House (H.R. 91, 179, 202, 270i 286, 313, 402, 509, 811, 826,
839, 846, 3,294; 3i3S33,8-I9" 3,844, 3,925,- 51st Cong: 1st Sess. [1889]) nine were referred to
the Ways and Means Committee, six to the Judiciary, and two to Manufactures. H.R. 30,
51st Cong. 1st Sess. (1889), a proposal for a constitutional amendment prohibiting trusts,
was also before the Judiciary Committee.
' 7 Ry. & Corp. L.J. 201 (1890).
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was quite certain to become law. For the moment, however, nothing seemed to
be happening.
Suddenly the situation changed, and in the last weeks of March 1890, the
serious work of preparing an antitrust law was begun. The burst of energy
may have come because the Republican congressmen gave up the idea, sup-
posing they ever had it, of treating the trust problem in the McKinley Tariff
Bill. To have done so would have given the impression that they agreed with
the Democrats about the causes of trusts and the constitutional powers avail-
able to destroy them. They may have felt that the public was becoming im-
patient, for congressmen were receiving an increasing number of petitions ad-
vocating antitrust legislation.176 Or the new activity may have come at Sher-
man's insistence. He announced a few days before it began that he had revised
his bill to meet George's objections,' 7 having deleted the provisions George
had criticized because they would make the law a criminal one and thus oblige
the courts to interpret it narrowly. In any case, by the time Sherman submit-
ted his new bill on March 21, the Senate was prepared to concentrate on it
and spent the next five days doing little else.
The great debate opened with a long, formal address in which Sherman
praised his bill. He began by explaining its political and legal theory. It was
intended, he said, to destroy combinations, not all combinations, but all those
which the common law had always condemned as unlawful. It was not in-
tended to outlaw all partnerships and corporations, though they were by na-
ture combinations. The corporations had demonstrated their usefulness by the
vast development of railroads and industry, and Sherman added-bearing in
mind the lingering prejudice against them-that as long as every man had the
right under general laws to form corporations, they were "not in any sense a
monopoly."' 178 But any combination which sought to restrain trade, any com-
bination of the leading corporations in an industry, organized in a trust to
stifle competition, dictate terms to railroads, command the price of labor, and
raise prices to consumers, was a "substantial monopoly." It smacked of tyr-
anny, "of kingly prerogative," and a nation that "would not submit to an em-
peror . ... should not submit to an autocrat of trade."'179 Sherman went on to
say that all such combinations in restraint of trade were prohibited by the
common law, wherever it was in force; it had always applied in the states, and
the "courts in different States have declared this thing, when it exists in a
171 A few public petitions and resolutions from state legislatures were read into the record
during the second session of the 50th Congress (Dec. 3, 1888 to March 3, 1889), 20 Cong.
Rec. 514, 1,234, 1,253, 1,273, 1,500, 1,589, 2,135 (1888-89). But between Dec. 2, 1889 and
March 21, 1890, forty-nine were entered. 21 Cong. Rec. (listed in Index, sub. "Trusts,
Petitions").
2,7 N.Y. Times p. 6, col. I (March 19, 1890).
78 21 Cong. Rec. 2,456 (1890).
2" Ibid.
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State, to be unlawful and void." Senator Cullom interrupted to ask, "Every-
where?" "In every case, everywhere,"' 80 Sherman replied, and went on to list
the recent decisions supporting his view. He first read the full opinion of the
Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Richardson v. Buhl,181 which had a
double attraction for him. It struck at the Diamond Match Company's mo-
nopoly, and it labeled as a monopolist General Russel Alger, one of his chief
rivals in 1888 for the Republican presidential nomination, the one whom
Sherman blamed for his unexpected defeat and publicly accused of having
bribed delegates.' 8 2 Sherman then cited other cases, which if they did not hold
the same personal interest for him, all supported the view that monopolies
and combinations in restraint of trade were unlawful and void in courts of
common law.183 But, he continued, the trusts were threatened by no similar
law in the federal courts and a statute was needed to enforce the common law
that already applied in state courts. Once again, he insisted that Congress was
authorized alike by the commerce and revenue clauses of the Constitution to
regulate combinations affecting interstate and foreign commerce; and he con-
cluded that his bill, based on this constitutional power and declaring the com-
mon law rule, would effectively destroy the power of the trusts.184
The debate which occupied much of the following week was untidy but not
without pattern. Many senators delivered great orations, but few were heard
to say that the trusts were desirable or an antitrust law unnecessary. George
repeatedly questioned the bill's constitutionality; certain of his Democratic
colleagues took occasion to avow their opposition to tariffs. A number of
senators tried to substitute their own bills for Sherman's and failing this they
attached them to his as amendments. By the end of the third day, the bill
before the Senate consisted of sixteen sections.185 Sherman's bill now had
h Ibid.
'n 77 Mich. 632 (1889), discussed supra note 132.
' The rumor that Alger, or his managers, bought votes of Southern delegates, reputedly
at $50.00 each, was reported at the time and has been repeated since by disinterested wit-
nesses: N.Y. Trib. (June 10, 1888) ; Stephenson, Nelson W. Aldrich 71, 434 n. 7 (1930) ; 2
Gresham, Life of Walter Quintin Gresham 574, 632 (1919). Sherman was convinced of its
truth and was openly antagonistic to Alger. When President Harrison signed the Antitrust
Bill, he is said to have remarked, "John Sherman has fixed General Alger," though this
story may well be apocryphal. 2 Gresham, supra, at 632. Though revenge cannot have been
Sherman's chief motive in pressing for the Act, there is no doubt that he was bitter about
the incident; he still referred to it angrily in his autobiography. 2 Sherman, Recollections
of Forty Years 1,029 (1895). And he did not forego the opportunity to indulge the passion;
contemporary observers remarked the relish with which he read the opinion in Richardson
v. Buhl. N.Y. Times p. 4, col. 3 (March 25, 1890).
'Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346 (1875) ; Chicago Gas Co. v. People's Gas Co., 121
Il. 530 (1887); People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Il. 268 (1889); People v. North
River Sugar Refining Co., 22 Abb. N.C. (N.Y.) 164 (1889), aff'd, 121 N.Y. 582 (1890).
21 Cong. Rec. 2,458 et seq. (1890).
"' Bills and Debates 217-22 (1890).
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tailing after it: Reagan's bill, which, instead of relying on common-law for-
mulas, gave a long explicit definition of the term "trust"; 186 Ingall's bill,
which was a more or less independent effort to prohibit speculation in farm
products; and George's clause, which exempted labor unions and farmers'
organizations from the general prohibitions. Moreover, the constitutional issue
was still confused, and George suggested that the bill be referred to the Ju-
diciary Committee, who, chosen for their legal wisdom, might be able to re-
store order to the law. Sherman, piqued and impatient, objected that it was
most unusual to transfer a bill from one committee to another; Reagan, whose
original bill had never yet been reported to the floor by the Judiciary Com-
mittee, was equally adamant; and Vance called the Judiciary Committee a
"grand mausoleum of Senatorial literature" in which this bill would be
buried.187 But after two more days in which further amendments were added
and further profound doubts expressed, the matter had become so tangled
that little alternative remained, and the bill was referred to the Judiciary
Committee with instructions to report within twenty days. L88
The Judiciary Committee took the matter out of Sherman's hands, much
to his regret and anger. But within a week, surprising everyone, the Com-
mittee produced a bill of its own. The work was done largely by its chair-
man, George Edmunds of. Vermont. He disposed of the constitutional ques-
tion very quickly: when the Committee first met to consider the bill, he pro-
posed to his colleagues "that it is competent for Congress to pass laws pre-
venting and punishing contracts etc. in restraint of commerce between the
states." And they, including George, who had raised objections to this theory
all along, unanimously agreed. 8 9 Edmunds then presented drafts of the criti-
cal sections of the Act, that made it a misdemeanor to engage in any combi-
nation in restraint of trade or to "monopolize" trade, and these were agreed
to by all the committeemen present. Two of the remaining sections were
written by others: George prepared the section authorizing the Attorney
General to sue for injunctions against violators, and Hoar wrote the section
authorizing private persons to sue violators for triple damages.'9 0 The Com-
" 'Reagan defined a trust as a "combination of capital, skill, or acts" by two or more
persons or associations for any of the following purposes: to restrict trade, to limit produc-
tion, to increase or reduce price, to prevent competition, to fix prices, to "create a monopoly,"
to make any agreement to set minimum prices, to agree to "pool, combine, or unite" so as
to affect prices. Sen. 62, 51st Cong. 1st Sess. (1889).
's' 21 Cong. Rec. 2,600 et seq., 2,604, 2,610 (1890). Ibid., at 2,731.
'Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Minute Book 226 (March 31, 1890) (Ms. in U.S.
Archives).
'The Committee Minute Book, ibid., at 227-33, shows that sections 1, 2, 5, and 6 were
drafted by.Edmunds, section 4 by George, section 7 by Hoar, and the phrase "in the form
of a trust or otherwise" by Evarts. It does not indicate who drafted sections 3 and 8. There
is a strong presumption, but no proof, to support Walker's assertion that Edmunds did;
consult Walker, Who Wrote the Sherman Law, 73 Cen. L.J. 257, 258 (1911).
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mittee's draft was in broad outline the same as Sherman's original bill, yet
Sherman was not pleased. He immediately denounced it as "totally ineffective
in dealing with combinations and trusts. All corporations can ride through it
or over it without fear of punishment or detection."'191 His reaction was par-
ticularly ungenerous, since aside from the fact that the new bill was simpler
than his, it differed mainly in providing a greater number of more severe
penalties. But when the time came, he voted for it, and as a matter of cour-
tesy it bears his name. The Senate as a whole seemed well satisfied, and after
hearing Edmunds' plea that they "pass a bill that is clear in its terms, is
definite in its definitions, and is broad in its comprehension, without winding
it up into infinite details,"'1 92 they passed it by fifty-two votes to one.
The action of the House was less systematic. Representative Culberson,
who was in charge of the debate, tried to limit it to one hour. His colleagues,
who had not until now considered any antitrust bill, complained that they
could not get printed copies of the one before them. A strong group insisted
that a section should be added to the bill specifically aimed at outlawing rail-
road and meat-packing pools. After a rather desultory debate, the House
passed the bill with one amendment, on May 1. During the next two months,
conferences were held between the two chambers, and the House was even-
tually prevailed on to withdraw its amendment.193 President Harrison signed
the bill, and it became law on July 2, 1890.
IV
The Sherman Act was as good an antitrust law as the Congress of 1890
could have devised. Congressmen had been called on to give the federal gov-
ernment novel powers to control, directly and generally, the organization of
economic life. They had little experience to teach them how such a law should
be written or to inform them how the courts might interpret it. They realized
from the beginning that whatever law they composed would be imperfect.
Its strongest advocates frankly admitted that it would be "experimental," 194
and in the end the whole of Congress was reconciled to the limitation Sher-
man recognized when he said, "All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare
general principles."' 95 Yet if the Sherman Act was an experiment, it was the
safest one Congress could make, and if it only declared general principles,
they were at least the familiar ones of the common law. Sherman had repeated-
'N.Y. Times p. 4, col. 4 (April 8, 1890).
"2 21 Cong. Rec. 3,148 (April 8, 1890).
Bills and Debates 327-402 (1890).
E.g., Senators Sherman, Edmunds, Turpie, and Representatives Culberson and Heard;
21 Cong. Rec. 2,460, 2,557-58, 3,148, 4,089, 4,101 (1890).
"5 21 Cong. Rec. 2,460 (1890).
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ly said that his bill was based on a tried formula: "It does not announce a
new principle of law, but applies old and well-recognized principles of the
common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Govern-
ment."'196 Edmunds, principal author of the Judiciary Committee bill, and
Hoar, who guided it through debate on the floor, said the same.197 Of the
eighty-two senators, sixty-eight were lawyers, and as one of them said, "I sup-
pose no lawyer needs to have argument made to him that these combinations
and trusts are illegal without statute."'198 They could not tell how the courts
would construe a statute that gave the government power to indict and sue
the offenders, but they believed that the courts would experience little diffi-
culty in recognizing the offense.
Congress had reason to think, further, that the Act aimed at the proper
goals. On the one hand, it satisfied the public demand for an antitrust law. It
prohibited trusts in so many words: it declared illegal "every contract, com-
bination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations."'199 This
specific mention of "trusts" had almost been omitted, for Edmunds so strong-
ly desired to define the offense in "terms that were well known to the law
already,12 0 0 that his draft of the section used only the common-law words,
"contract," "combination," and "conspiracy." But a majority of his colleagues
on the Judiciary Committee had seen the political value of adding a term
that was well known to the public and had agreed to insert Evart's phrase,
"in the form of a trust or otherwise."20 '
On the other hand, the Act did not go farther than Congress thought it
should. Congressmen were no more in favor of unlimited competition than the
economists were. Sherman, in his great address, had emphasized that many
combinations were desirable. He was sure that they had been an important
cause of America's wealth, and he had no intention of prohibiting them. It
was only "the unlawful combination, tested by the rules of common law and
human experience, that is aimed at by this bill, and not the lawful and use-
ful combination.120 2 Edmunds and Hoar later said they had the same inten-
tion.203 A majority of the representatives who conferred with senators about
'Ibid., at 2,456. ' Ibid., at 3,148, 3,146, 3,152.
Sen. Teller, 21 Cong. Rec. 2,458 (1890).
i 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1951).
c21 Cong. Rec. 3,148 (1890).
201 See note 190 supra.
21 Cong. Rec. 2,457 (1890). Cf. ibid., at 2,460.
'Washburn, The History of a Statute 9 (1927); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n,
171 U.S. 505, 544 et seq. (1898) ; 2 Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate Com-
merce, pursuant to Sen. Res. 98, 62d Cong. 1st Sess., 1,550, 2,430 (1912).
[Vol. 23
1956] CONGRESS AND THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST LAW 257
the House amendment opposed it for similar reasons. They said that the
bill's "only object was the control of trusts, so called," but that the scope of
the amendment was broader, and indeed too broad: "It declares illegal any
agreement for relief from the effects of competition in the two industries of
transportation and merchandising, however excessive or destructive such
competition may be."2 04 Senator Teller meant the same, although he used
impolitic language, when he said that "a trust may not always be an evil.
A trust for certain purposes, which may mean simply a combination of capi-
tal, may be a favorable thing to the community and the country." 20 5 Per-
haps the clearest statement of this view, held by many congressmen as well
as by many economists of the period, was that of Representative Stewart of
Vermont:
[Tlhere are two great forces working in human society in this country to-day, and
they have been contending for the mastery on one side or the other for the last two
generations. Those two great forces are competition and combination. They are cor-
rectives of each other, and both ought to exist. Both ought to be under restraint.
Either of them, if allowed to be unrestrained, is destructive of the material interests
of this country.20 6
The common law was a perfect instrument for realizing the policy supported
by Congress. It prohibited monopolies but not all combinations, and congress-
men felt that a statute based on it would have equally qualified effects.
Though the pattern of the law was sound, there were nevertheless defects
in detail. Various ambiguities had crept in because so many men had part in
dirafting it, because they wanted it to be simple and general, and because they
wanted to use common-law terms to define the offenses. In order to keep the
law broad, Congress did not specifically exclude labor unions from its scope or
include railroad pools. So far as their sentiments were expressed in debates and
bills, they had favored unions or wanted to leave them immune from this law.
Sherman said they should be specifically exempted and many agreed with
him.20 7 Edmunds almost alone spoke against a specific exemption, because he
thought that labor unions should be treated like any other combination.208
But when he came to write the bill he was mainly concerned with keeping it
unqualified. His colleagues seem to have been convinced by his arguments in
favor of simplicity. Although during the debates four of the eight members of
J' 21 Cong. Rec. 5,950 (1890).
Ibid., at 2,471.
Ibid., at 5,956.
Sherman, ibid., at 2,562, 2,611-12; Hiscock, ibid., at 2,468; Teller, ibid., at 2,561-62;
Reagan, ibid., at 2,562; Gray, ibid., at 2,657. Consult also, note 209 infra. The exemptions
were included in Sen. 1, 6, and H.R. 91, 402, 509, 826, 3,819, 3,844, 51st Cong. 1st Sess.
(1890).
"21 Cong. Rec. 2,726-29 (1890).
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the Judiciary Committee spoke for exempting labor unions,20 9 they all voted
for Edmunds' draft, probably because they agreed that the law should not be
cluttered with details and felt that, in any case, it would not be construed
against unions. Reasoning of the same sort explains why railroad pools were
not specifically named as offenders, for Senator Vest, a member of the Judi-
ciary Committee, in commenting on the House amendment, said that he too
had wanted to add an explicit prohibition, until the other committeemen con-
vinced him it would be redundant.2 10 In order to make the Act more inclusive,
Congress introduced another note that added to its ambiguity. "Restraints of
trade," as the common law understood them, could only come about through
agreement between persons; but the Judiciary Committee felt that the Act
should also condemn any individual who restrained trade by himself, and they
therefore drafted a section making it illegal for any individual to "monopo-
lize." Hoar and Edmunds assured the Senate that the word had a well-known
meaning at common law,211 and their advice was followed although the word
meant little more at common law than the engrossing of a local food supply.
These were only a few of the blemishes that marred the Act; the courts in
time found many more. But to have drawn up a more satisfactory solution
for a new and difficult problem, congressmen would have had to be much
more adept, much more remote from public opinion, and much more unani-
mous in their own views, than the lawmakers of a democracy ever can be.
"Hoar, ibid., at 2,728; Wilson, ibid., at 2,658; Coke, ibid., at 2,613-15. George was the
author of the proviso in the first place. It appeared in his Sen. 6, 51st Cong. 1st Sess. (1890),
from which Sherman borrowed it, 21 Cong. Rec. 2,611 (1890).
210 21 Cong. Rec. 6,116 (1890). See also the remark by Hoar, ibid., at 4,560.
- Ibid., at 3,151-52.
